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Freedom of Expression and the
Law of the Democratic Process
Colin Feasby*
I. INTRODUCTION
Harper v. Canada is the third and (probably) final chapter in a 20year struggle between the National Citizens’ Coalition and the federal
government over election laws.1 The contest was ostensibly about the
regulation of election expenditures made by third parties — individuals
and organizations who are neither candidates nor political parties. Third
party expenditure limits, though important to those affected, are at the
margins of the campaign finance regime. The fact that the struggle over
third party expenditure limits has enjoyed relative prominence compared
to other challenges and potential challenges to the constitutionality of
the federal campaign finance regime is curious.2 Like the proxy wars
between the United States and the U.S.S.R., however, Harper and earlier third party spending cases were really about a larger ideological question; namely, whether an egalitarian or libertarian model of election
regulation would prevail in Canada. Harper answered the question definitively — Canada’s philosophy of election regulation is first and
foremost egalitarian.
This paper is not a critique of the Supreme Court of Canada’s egalitarian model of elections. The precepts of the Court’s egalitarian model

*
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP (Calgary). I thank Mike Dorf, Rick Hasen, Sam
Issacharoff, and Greg Tardi for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Responsibility for all errors and omissions is, of course, my own.
1
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 [hereinafter “Harper (SCC)”].
2
The focus of the debate over election regulation in Canada on third party expenditures is
especially curious given relatively low levels of third party activity in most Canadian elections and
the existence of other contestable regulations that pertain to candidates and political parties. For a
discussion of other election regulations that may contravene the Charter, see C. Feasby, “The
Supreme Court of Canada’s Political Theory and the Constitutionality of the Political Finance
Regime” in K.D. Ewing & S. Issacharoff, Party Funding and Campaign Financing in International
Perspective (Oxford: Hart, 2005) (forthcoming).

238

Supreme Court Law Review

(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d)

will be reviewed, but not contested. Instead, it will be asked whether the
Supreme Court’s understanding of the egalitarian model led it in Harper
to be insufficiently rigorous in its scrutiny of third party expenditure
limits. Previously I have argued that one of the central assumptions of
the egalitarian model is that limits on political expression are inherent in
the electoral context. This is what I call the “paradox of political expression.” The shortcoming of my earlier work is that once the big picture
case for deference in the electoral context was made, the question of the
exercise of that deference was underdeveloped.3 Both of my previous
papers made the case for deference to Parliament’s choice of democratic
values, but concluded that the specific third party limits enacted by the
Canada Elections Act were nevertheless unconstitutional. What this
paper attempts to develop is an explanation for how the Court can circumscribe the application of the egalitarian model by defining the
boundaries of the electoral context and can exercise a principled deference and more rigorous judicial review within those boundaries in a way
that is consistent with the egalitarian model.
The focus of the following discussion concerns two main aspects of
the Court’s approach to the judicial review of democratic process questions. First is the question of the breadth of the egalitarian model as a
justification for limiting political expression. In doctrinal terms, this
question is played out under the rubrics of vagueness and overbreadth.
The third party expenditure limits considered in Harper arguably extended to all political expression within an election campaign period
including so-called issue advocacy. Issue advocacy comes in two forms:
(1) “sham issue advocacy” which is really advocacy for or against a
particular candidate or political party; and (2) “pure issue advocacy”
which is expression concerning an issue of public policy with no reference, veiled or otherwise, to a candidate or political party. 4 The Harper
trial court found that the third party limits were impermissibly vague or
overbroad or both because they applied to expression concerning issues

3
C. Feasby, “Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) and the Administration of the Process of Democracy Under the Charter: The Emerging Egalitarian Model” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 5 [hereinafter
“The Emerging Egalitarian Model”]; and C. Feasby, “Issue Advocacy and Third Parties in the
United Kingdom and Canada” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 11.
4
See R. Briffault, “Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line” (1999) 77
Tex. L. Rev. 1751; R. Hasen, “The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and
Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy” (2000) 48 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 265.
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“associated with political parties or candidates.”5 Essentially, the trial
court found that expression concerning issues associated with candidates and political parties could be political without necessarily being
electoral in nature. In other words, the regulation of third party expenditures captures pure issue advocacy. The Supreme Court nevertheless
found that the overarching legislative objective — fair elections —
justified the broadly framed spending limits. The majority of the Court’s
conclusion that the third party spending limits were neither vague nor
overbroad betrays a lack of understanding of electoral context and the
problems that face actual participants in the electoral process. Moreover,
the Court’s failure to take the definitional question seriously indicates
that the egalitarian principles that justify the regulation of electoral
expression may be stretched beyond the electoral context.
Second, the Court’s deferential approach to judicial review in Harper is inconsistent with an appreciation for the rough and tumble of the
electoral context. After concluding that third party spending limits are
consistent with the egalitarian model and, therefore, pressing and substantial, the majority in Harper deferred to Parliament’s assessment of
the appropriate level for the third party spending limits. The minority
decision is less deferential, but its difference with the majority is underdeveloped. The thrust of the argument against the reflexive deference
exhibited in Harper is that when participation in the democratic process
is limited in a way that protects the status quo in some fashion, stricter
scrutiny is necessary. The inspiration for this argument is the revival of
process theory as a basis for judicial review in the emerging academic
discipline of law and the democratic process in the United States and
elsewhere.6 A main premise common to most process theories is that
politicians have an interest in shaping electoral rules to protect the status
quo or even enhance their position vis à vis their competition. Substantive and dialogue theories have rightly prevailed over process theories as
the orthodoxy in Canadian academic and judicial circles as general
accounts of judicial review.7 The swing of the pendulum to substantive
5

Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2001] A.J. No. 808, 295 A.R. 1 (Q.B.) [hereinafter “Harper (Q.B.)”].
6
S. Issacharoff & R. Pildes, “Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process” (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643; R. Pildes, “The Theory of Political Competition” (1999) 85
Va. L. Rev. 1605.
7
For a discussion of the fate of process theory in Canada, see: K. Roach, “American Constitutional Theory for Canadians (And the Rest of the World)” (2002) 52 U.T.L.J. 503. On dialogue
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and dialogue theories of judicial review, however, has impoverished the
Court’s approach to cases concerning the democratic process. Process
theories, such as that famously espoused by the late John Hart Ely, have
important insights to offer that might provide a corrective to the overly
deferential approach of the Court in Harper.8 The limited role for process theory that is proposed in this paper has Canadian precedents. Indeed, it will be suggested that this approach is consistent with some of
the Supreme Court’s recent democratic process cases and was foreshadowed by Dean Patrick Monahan’s theory of judicial review under the
Charter.9
The second part of the paper takes a step back from the main arguments to be advanced and introduces a field of study that is largely neglected in the Canadian legal academy: “Law and the Democratic
Process.” This emerging sub-discipline of constitutional law provides
many of the concepts and much of the context that is missing from Harper. Indeed, the appropriateness of an election-specific approach to free
speech and the relative merits of process theory and more robust theories of judicial review in democratic process cases are two of the many
debates that have animated law and the democratic process scholarship
in recent years. Identifying the lack of Canadian academic debate in this
area is of particular importance given that Canadian courts appear to be
increasingly confronting democratic process problems. The third part of
this paper reviews the lower court and Supreme Court of Canada decisions in Harper. The analysis of the definitional question that relates to
the question of issue advocacy and the Court’s justification for its deferential approach are highlighted. The fourth part of this paper situates
Harper within the larger context of the debate over issue advocacy. The
regulation of pure issue advocacy, it is argued, is not supported by the
egalitarian model. The concern for defining the electoral realm discussed in part four in the context of issue advocacy is an important
complement to the approach to judicial review outlined in the fifth part

theory, see P. Hogg & A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or
Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75
and K. Roach, The Supreme Court Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2001).
8
J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1980).
9
P. Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme
Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell 1987).
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of this paper. The fifth part of this paper questions the Court’s deferential stance and suggests that the egalitarian model of elections does not
require deference in all circumstances. A principled approach to deference that draws upon aspects of process theory is proposed.

II. LAW AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
From an international perspective, Canada is at the leading edge of
many of the developments in constitutional law. Canadian courts and
legal scholars are pioneers in equality rights, the rights of Aboriginal
peoples, and many other areas of constitutional law. One area of constitutional law that has suffered comparative neglect is the intersection
between the Charter and the democratic process. Before the publication
of Gregory Tardi’s two-volume work titled The Law of Democratic
Governing in late 2004, with a few salient exceptions, Canadian legal
scholarship in the last 20 years is barren of any sustained or serious
consideration of the legal regulation of the democratic process and related constitutional issues.10 Interestingly, some of the most significant
contributions to the Canadian literature on law and the democratic process are from sources outside the legal academy such as student articles,11 books by members of the practising bar,12 efforts of foreign
scholars,13 and political scientists.14 Canadian political scientists, in
10
G. Tardi, The Law of Democratic Governing (Toronto: Carswell, 2004). The most obvious exception to this generalization is J. Patrick Boyer’s reference work, Election Law in Canada:
The Law and Procedure of Federal, Provincial and Territorial Elections (Toronto: Butterworths,
1987). Boyer’s Election Law and his other publications are principally descriptive and do not
contemplate the impact of the Charter in depth.
11
See, e.g.: N. Devlin, “Opinion Polls and the Protection of Political Speech — A Comment on Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General)” (1996-1997) Ottawa L. Rev.
412; C. Feasby, “Egalitarian Model” supra, note 3; C. Feasby, “Public Opinion Poll Restrictions,
Elections, and the Charter” (1997) 55 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 241; T. Knight, “Unconstitutional Democracy? A Charter Challenge to Canada’s Electoral System” (1999) 57 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1;
T. Knight, “Electoral Justice for Aboriginal People in Canada” (2001) 46 McGill L.J. 1063; J.
LaCalamita, “The Equitable Campaign: Party Political Broadcasting Regulation in Canada” (1984)
22 Osgoode Hall L.J. 543.
12
See, e.g.: Tardi, The Law of Democratic Governing, supra, note 10; and Boyer, Election
Law in Canada, supra, note 10.
13
See, e.g.: A.C. Geddis, “Liberté, Egalité, Argent: Third Party Election Spending and the
Charter” (2004) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 429; A.C. Geddis, “Democratic Visions and Third-Party Independent Expenditures: A Comparative View” (2001) 9 Tul. L. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 5; K.D. Ewing,
Money, Politics, and Law: A Study of Campaign Finance Reform in Canada (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992).
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particular, deserve credit for exploring the intersection of law and the
democratic process from the perspective of their academic discipline.
Canadian law faculties, however, have accomplished little in this area.15
This is not surprising because there is not a single tenured or tenure
track professor in Canada who identifies law and the democratic process
as a primary or even secondary research interest. The lack of interest in
law and the democratic process is also reflected in many faculty-taught
entry level constitutional law courses where the study of democratic
rights and freedom of expression cases that implicate the democratic
process occupy a subordinate position to subjects that are more fashionable in the Canadian legal academy. Despite the barren landscape described, there are signs that this tradition of neglect is waning. During

14

On the constitutionality of campaign finance laws, e.g., various articles by J. Hiebert including, “Money and Elections: Can Citizens Participate on Fair Terms Amidst Unrestricted
Spending?” (1998) 31:1 Canadian Journal of Political Science 91; various articles by H. Bakvis &
J. Smith including, “Third-Party Advertising and Electoral Democracy: The Political Theory of the
Alberta Court of Appeal in Somerville v. Canada (Attorney General)” (1997) 23:2 Can. Pub. Pol’y
164; L. Young, “Regulating Campaign Finance in Canada: Strengths and Weaknesses” (2004) 3
Elect. L.J. 444. On redistricting and the question of one person, one vote see John C. Courtney’s
many articles and books including, Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada’s Electoral Districts
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001). On the constitutional rights of
small political parties, for example: H. MacIvor, The Charter of Rights and Party Politics: The
Impact of the Supreme Court of Canada Ruling in Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General) (2004)
10 Choices (Montreal: IRPP) and H. MacIvor, “Judicial Review and Electoral Democracy: The
Contested Status of Political Parties Under the Charter” (2002) 21 Windsor Y.B. Access to Just.
479. Generally on judicial review and the democratic process, see: J. Smith & H. Bakvis, “Judicial
Review and Electoral Law” in M. Westmacott & H. Mellon, eds., Political Dispute and Judicial
Review: Assessing the Work of the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Nelson, 2000), at 64;
H. MacIvor, Canadian Politics and Government in the Charter Era (Toronto: Thomson Nelson,
2006) (forthcoming); R. Knopff, “How Democratic is the Charter? And Does it Matter?” (2003) 19
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 199.
15
One notable exception is a symposium held jointly by the University of Saskatchewan
College of Law and Department of Political Science in 1992 to discuss Reference re Provincial
Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158. See J.C. Courtney,
P. MacKinnon, & D.E. Smith, Drawing Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts, and Electoral Values
(Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 1992) featuring contributions or commentaries from law
professors R. Fritz, K. Roach, and K. Swinton. Participants in that symposium have also dealt with
the question of redistricting in other articles, see: R. Fritz, “The 1990s Federal Electoral Boundaries
Readjustments and the Charter” (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 467; R. Fritz, “Challenging Electoral
Boundaries Under the Charter: Judicial Deference and Burden of Proof” (1999) 5 Rev. Const. Stud.
1; K. Roach, “Reapportionment in British Columbia” (1990) 24 U.B.C. L. Rev. 79. Other law
review articles written by Canadian law professors over the last 20 years include: B. Schwartz,
“Proportional Representation for Canada?” (2001) 28 Man. L.J. 133; R. Haigh, “Between Here and
There Is Better Than Anything Over There: The Morass of Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral
Officer)” (2003) 20 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 353; J. Cameron, “Governance and Anarchy in the s. 2(b)
Jurisprudence: A Comment on Re Vancouver Sun and Harper v. Canada” (2005) 17 N.J.C.L. 71.
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the past year, three Canadian law schools, two for the first time, offered
upper year courses that featured the democratic process as the central
focus or as a major topic.16 However, it is significant that all three
courses were taught by non-faculty members.
The dearth of attention to the democratic process among Canadian
legal scholars may be attributable to the relative inattention of the
Supreme Court of Canada to the same subject. While the Supreme
Court of Canada has considered many political questions since the
advent of the Charter, it considered surprisingly few cases concerning
the democratic process during the first 15 years of the Charter. 17 More
16
University of Alberta, Law 599: “Law and the Democratic Process” (Fall, 2004) (Instructor: Colin Feasby). University of Ottawa, CML 4104E: “Studies in Public Law: The Law of
Canadian Democracy” (Winter, 2005) (Instructor: Aaron Freeman). Note that the University of
Ottawa course concerns a number of the practical aspects of the practice of politics such as lobbyist
regulation and the role of the ethics counsellor that are not necessarily constitutional in nature.
McGill University, CMPL 518: “Policies, Politics, and the Legislative Process” (Instructor: Gregory Tardi). The McGill University course concerns “political law” which Greg Tardi defines as
broadly to include all of the practices and procedures of Parliament as well as those subjects that
are said to comprise law and the democratic process in this paper. The Alberta, Ottawa, and McGill
courses should be distinguished from those such as Michael Mandel’s “Legal Politics” course at
Osgoode Hall which concerns how law deals with “political issues” rather than the “political
process” although the two are intertwined to some extent. Kent Roach’s course “The Role of Courts
in a Democracy” at the University of Toronto also touches on some democratic process issues, but
is concerned more with the broader question of the legitimacy of courts and judicial review in a
democratic society.
17
Notable exceptions to this generalization are Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), supra, note 15; Haig v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993] 2
S.C.R. 995; and Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 82, [1996] 2
S.C.R. 876. The Supreme Court has denied leave on the following cases which appear to meet the
criteria of “public importance” and uncertainty in the law: Re Allman v. Northwest Territories
(Commissioner), [1984] 1 S.C.R. v (challenging residency requirements for voting in a referendum); Campbell v. Canada, [1988] 6 W.W.R. lxviii (concerning allocation of seats in the House of
Commons among the provinces and with a strong dissent at the British Columbia Court of Appeal);
Pacific Press v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 628 (striking down B.C.
Elections Act third party election expense restrictions contrary to Libman and striking down mandatory disclosure of polling data contrary to obiter in Thomson Newspapers, [1998] S.C.J. No. 44,
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 877; Charlottetown (City) v. Prince Edward Island, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 64
(interpreting Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries as setting out a +/- 25 per cent rule contrary to the
interpretation of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Reference re: Electoral Division Statutes Amendment Act, 1993, [1994] A.J. No. 768 (C.A.)); and Fitzgerald (Next friend of) v. Alberta, [2004]
S.C.C.A. No. 349 (challenging age restrictions on the right to vote). The following cases were
either not appealed to the Supreme Court or leave applications were discontinued: Lac la Biche
(Town) v. Alberta, [1994] S.C.C.A. No. 500 (concerning principles other than population applicable
to redistricting); Barrette v. Canada, [1994] Q.J. No. 219, 113 D.L.R. (4th) 623 (C.A.) (challenging
the threshold for reimbursement of election expenditures in federal elections); Reference re:
Electoral Division Statutes Amendment Act, 1993, [1994] A.J. No. 768 (C.A.) (concerning burden
of justifying population deviations); Reform Party of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995]
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recent cases suggest that the Supreme Court’s reluctance to tackle
democratic process cases in the early Charter era may be receding.
Beginning with Libman18 in 1997 and continuing with the Secession
Reference19 and Thomson Newspapers20 in 1998, Corbière21 in 1999,
Figueroa22 in 2002, Sauvé23 in 2003, and now Harper in 2004 the
Supreme Court is showing an increasing propensity for wading into
the political thicket.24 Moreover, an unscientific survey of case law
from lower courts over the past year indicates that the democratic
process is contested in Canadian courts more than ever before. 25 The
Supreme Court’s emerging jurisprudence of the democratic process
and the growth in litigation over the democratic process merit a commensurate increase in scholarly attention.

A.J. No. 793, 10 W.W.R. 764 (C.A.) (challenging the reservation and allocation of broadcast time
for political broadcasts and with a strong dissent in the Alberta Court of Appeal); Somerville v.
Canada (Attorney General), [1996] A.J. No. 515, 184 A.R. 241 (C.A.).
18
Libman v. Canada (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569.
19
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217.
20
Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1
S.C.R. 877.
21
Corbière v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] S.C.J. No. 24,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 203.
22
Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912.
23
Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 519.
24
The “political thicket” is the evocative description used by Frankfurter J. to describe
laws governing the democratic process: Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 at 556 (1946). Justice
Frankfurter was of the view that the Court should not involve itself in political questions such as the
apportionment question before the Court in Colgrove.
25
Lower court cases concerning the democratic process within the last 12 months include:
Lukaszuk v. Kibermanis, [2005] A.J. No. 167 (C.A.) (contested election and meaning of voter
intention); R. v. Bryan, [2004] B.C.J. No. 451 (C.A.) (leave to appeal successful Charter challenge
of publication ban on election results prior to close of polls in British Columbia); Baier v. Alberta,
[2004] A.J. No. 1003 (Q.B.) (Charter s. 2(b) challenge to restrictions on school board employees
standing for election to school board); Fitzgerald v. Alberta, [2004] A.J. No. 570 (C.A.) (Charter
s. 3 challenge concerning the right of persons under 18 to vote); Danielson v. Calgary City, [2004]
A.J. No. 1404 (Q.B.) (alleged electoral fraud in municipal election); Barron v. Warkentin, [2004]
A.J. No. 919 (Q.B.) (jurisdiction of court to interfere with regulation of constituency nomination
contest); Raîche v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] F.C.J. No. 839 (T.D.) (minority rights in
redistricting process); Grewal v. Conservative Party of Canada, [2004] O.J. No. 2299 (S.C.)
(constituency nomination dispute — disqualification of candidate for criminal record); Ahenakew v.
MacKay, [2004] O.J. No. 2318 (C.A.) (regulation and merger of political parties); Sinclair v.
Conservative Party of Canada, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1966 (T.D.) (judicial review of Chief Electoral
Officer’s decision on merger of political parties); Barkley v. Anderson, [2004] A.J. No. 1307 (C.A.)
(dispute over voter lists in nomination contest); Bellerose v. Patenaude, [2004] A.J. No. 1063
(Q.B.) (contested election in a Métis Settlement); Monaghan v. Joyce, [2004] N.J. No. 76 (Nfld.
S.C.T.D.) (application to void an election).
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The dearth of study of the legal regulation of the democratic process
in Canada is in stark contrast to developments in other constitutional
democracies where the study of the role of the courts in policing the
democratic process is a burgeoning academic industry. The United
States is at the vanguard of the study of law and the democratic process.
This is not surprising given the history of prominent U.S. cases concerning the democratic process beginning with the one person, one vote
cases in the 1960s and extending through Bush v. Gore and the more
recent battles over the California recall election and the 2004 elections.
Symposia in leading law reviews on the democratic process are common,26 many major law schools offer at least one upper year course on
the subject,27 there are two commercial case books available,28 and recently a specialist legal journal — the Election Law Journal — was
founded.29 The study of law and the democratic process is not an academic ghetto confined to specialists. Quite the opposite, in fact. Giants
of the U.S. legal academy including Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin,
Owen Fiss, Frank Michelman, Richard Posner, Frederick Schauer, and
Cass Sunstien have all given democratic process questions serious consideration over the past decade both before and after the seminal event
of Bush v. Gore.30 The growth in the study of law and the democratic
26
See, e.g., “Symposium: Regulating the Electoral Process” (1993) 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1409;
“Law and the Political Process” (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 605; “Symposium: The Law and Economics of Election Law” (1999) 85 Va. L. Rev. 1533; “Election Law as its Own Field of Study” (1999)
32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1095; “Symposium: Law and Political Parties” (2000) 100 Colum. L. Rev.
593; “Symposium: Baker v. Carr: A Commemorative Symposium” (2002) N.C. L. Rev. 1103;
“Symposium: Federal Courts and Electoral Politics” (2002) 82 Boston U. L. Rev. 608; “Symposium: The Supreme Court and Election Law” (2004) 31 J. of Legislation 1; “Symposium: Law of
Democracy” (2004) 153 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1; “Symposium: Democracy and Elections in North
America: What Can We Learn from Our Neighbor?” (2004) 3 Election L. J. 396.
27
Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, NYU, Pennsylvania, Stanford, UCLA, Virginia
and Yale. For a complete list of law and the democratic process teachers and their respective universities, see the database posted online at: <www.electionlaw.org> (last accessed 17 June 2005).
28
S. Issacharoff, P. Karlan, & R. Pildes, eds., The Law of Democracy, 2d ed. (New York:
Foundation Press, 2001); D. Lowenstein & R. Hasen, eds., Election Law—Cases and Materials, 3d
ed. (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2004).
29
The first issue of the Election Law Journal was released in March 2002.
30
See, e.g., B. Ackerman & I. Ayres, Voting With Dollars: A New Paradigm for
Campaign Finance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); R. Dworkin, ed., A Badly
Flawed Election: (Debating) Bush v. Gore, The Supreme Court and American Democracy
(New York: The New Press, 2002) (with contributions by L. Guinier, R. Posner, C. Sunstein,
L. Tribe, and others); R. Dworkin, “The Curse of American Politics” 43:16 The New York
Review of Books (17 October 1996) 19; R. Dworkin, “Free Speech and the Dimensions of
Democracy in E. Joshua Rosenkranz, ed., If Buckley Fell: A First Amendment Blueprint for
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process is not a phenomenon peculiar to the United States. Two recent
law review symposia have been dedicated to law and the democratic
process in Australia.31 Moreover, there is a growing international community of scholars examining developments in law and the democratic
process from a comparative perspective.32
The profusion of legal writing on the democratic process has given
rise to a growing recognition in the U.S. and elsewhere that the intersection of constitutional law and the democratic process is a distinct subdiscipline of constitutional law with recognizable parameters. In a law
review symposium dedicated to the subject of “Election Law as its Own
Field of Study,” Pamela Karlan asked rhetorically: “What then does it
mean to talk about the legal structure of the political process as its own
field of study?” According to Karlan:
The law governing politics is a form of applied constitutional law; it
involves repeated interactions among statutes and constitutional
provisions, courts and legislatures, and state and national
governments. Moreover, looking at the statutes, structures, and cases
that govern our politics as it is actually conducted may offer a far
richer avenue for understanding constitutional law generally than
pursuing ever more theoretical and abstract forms of constitutional
33
theory….

Regulating Money in Politics (New York: Century Foundation Press, 1999) at 63; O. Fiss,
The Irony of Free Speech (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); F.
Michelman, “Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument” (1989) 41
Fla. L. Rev. 443; R. Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2003); C. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (Toronto:
Maxwell Macmillan, 1993); C. Sunstein, “Political Equality and Unintended Consequences”
(1994) 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1390; F. Schauer, “Judicial Review of the Devices of Democracy”
(1994) 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1326; F. Schauer & R. Pildes, “Electoral Exceptionalism and the
First Amendment” (1999) 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1803.
31
“Electoral Law Symposium: An Introduction” (2004) 32 Fed. L. Rev. 1; “Special Issue:
Electoral Regulation” (1998) 7(2) Griffith L. Rev. 1. See also, G. Orr, B. Mercurio, & G. Williams,
Realising Democracy: Electoral Law in Australia (Annadale: Federation Press, 2003).
32
See, e.g., K.D. Ewing & S. Issacharoff, Party Funding and Campaign Financing in International Perspective (Oxford: Hart, 2005) (forthcoming).
33
P. Karlan, “Election Law as its Own Field of Study: Constitutional Law, the Political
Process, and the Bondage of Discipline” (1999) 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1185, at 1196. On January 31,
2005 Greg Tardi wrote to a long list of mostly Canadian constitutional law scholars and practitioners echoing Karlan in a call for the creation of a community of scholars to study what he calls
“political law”:

(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Expression and the Democratic Process

247

The field of study described by Karlan, is both old and new.34 Law
and the democratic process as a field of study comprises much of the
constitutional law that would have been familiar to Dicey and Bagehot.35 Indeed, the right to vote, the form of the electoral system, and
rules applicable to Parliament were central parts of constitutional law as
it was known prior to the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Charter. The
field of study is only new in the sense that it marries a Diceyan concept
of constitutional law — small “c” constitutional law — with contemporary big “C” constitutional law which in Canada is dominated by the
Charter. Subjects that fall within the ambit of law and the democratic
process are at least: (1) contested elections and referenda; (2) campaign
finance (public funding, spending limits, allocation of free broadcasting,
etc.); (3) redistricting; (4) minority rights in the democratic process;
(5) limits on participatory rights; (6) the structure of the electoral system; (7) non-financial limits on expression during elections and referenda; and (8) the role and regulation of candidates, political parties and

Political law can be defined as the study of the interaction among public law, public policy
and administration, and politics, as well as examination of the influence and impact of legality on the conduct of democratic governing.
There is a genuine need for recognition of political law as an autonomous field of study and
practice. Some Canadian law schools devote insufficient attention to evolving public law
issues in their core teaching. Universities tend to teach public policy and administration, and
politics, as if they were unrelated to each other and especially to public law. The professions
dealing with governing are fragmented on the basis of such educational streaming. The literature about government is diffuse. Even informed public discourse tends to underplay the
fundamental contribution of legality to democracy.
34
G. Orr, B. Mercurio, & G. Williams, “Electoral Law Symposium: An Introduction”
(2004) 32 Fed. L. Rev. 1, at 3 remarking on the debate between “Election Law” (Hasen and Lowenstein’s preferred term) and the “Law of Democracy” (Issacharoff, Pildes & Karlan’s preferred
term): “An intermediate title might be the ‘Law of Politics’. It has the advantage of capturing a field
of human activity, rather than a discrete process (elections) or a vague aspiration (democracy).”
Greg Tardi, supra, note 10 prefers the term “political law.” I am agnostic on the term used to
describe the subject area. In this paper and elsewhere I use the label “law and the democratic
process.”
35
W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); A.V.
Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed.) (Toronto: Macmillan,
1923). Dicey wrote at 22-23:
Constitutional law, as the term is used in England, appears to include all rules which directly or indirectly affect the distribution and exercise of the sovereign power in the state.
Hence it includes (among other things) all rules which define the members of the sovereign
power, all rules which regulate the relation of such members to each other, or which determine the mode in which the sovereign power, of the members thereof, exercise their authority. Its rules prescribe the order of succession to the throne, regulate the prerogatives of the
chief magistrate, determine the form of the legislature and its mode of election.
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third parties. Each of these subjects raise both small “c” and big “C”
constitutional issues.
Even if the suggestion is accepted that law and the democratic process has been neglected by the Canadian legal academy, one might well
ask: “So what?” The first and foremost reason why law and the democratic process matters is that for better or worse the Supreme Court of
Canada’s Charter analysis is explicitly contextual.36 Context, in law and
democratic process cases, concerns the nature of politics and the relationship between political actors and the legal regime that regulates
politics. Individual litigants too often overlook context, so sometimes
the courts look to the legal academy for reflection on the larger implications of discrete controversies. Law and the democratic process, as the
discipline has evolved in the United States, has been the crucible for a
vibrant debate and cross-fertilization between political scientists and
constitutional lawyers. This debate and cross-fertilization has both
deepened the legal analysis of democratic process issues and made the
work of political scientists more accessible to the courts. This is not to
suggest that U.S. courts have availed themselves of the ample body of
literature that exists in that country or that their decision-making is any
better than that of the Supreme Court of Canada; rather, it is to suggest
that if a robust Canadian law and the democratic process literature existed, it could assist the Court to appreciate the context of the democratic
process. As will be explained later in this paper, the Court’s lack of
appreciation for context is one of the shortcomings of the Harper decision. One cannot help but wonder if the absence of a vibrant Canadian
literature on law and the democratic process is partially responsible for
the Supreme Court’s impoverished understanding of context.
Quite apart from understanding the practice of politics in context,
the law and democratic process scholarship has confronted anew debates over the relationship between legislatures and the courts and the
nature of judicial review. It is no accident that democratic process issues
have attracted the attention of many of the leading U.S. legal theorists in
recent years. This development is particularly apposite given that the
Supreme Court of Canada in its recent democratic process cases has

36
For a criticism of the Supreme Court’s contextual approach see generally, J. Cameron,
“The Past, Present, and Future of Expressive Freedom Under the Charter” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 1. See also, C. Bredt and A. Dodek , “The Increasing Irrelevance of Section 1 of the Charter”
(2001) 14 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 175, at 184-85.
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both unabashedly stepped into the realm of political theory and struggled with developing a principled approach to judicial review. Perhaps
the most obvious failure of the Court is that it has not developed a principled approach to judicial review in democratic process cases. As this
paper will endeavour to explain later, the U.S. debate between an explicitly normative approach and a more structural or process-oriented approach to democratic process cases is relevant to the predicament in
which the Supreme Court of Canada finds itself after Harper. Indeed, it
will be suggested that heightened sensitivity to process questions in both
section 2(b) and section 3 cases may bring much needed coherence to
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of the democratic process.

III. HARPER V. CANADA
1. Canada Elections Act 2000 — Third Party Election Spending
Limits
Third party spending limits have been a central feature of the Canadian political finance regime since it was first conceived. The main
pillars of Canada’s political finance legislation, including third party
spending limits, were originally suggested in Canada by the Barbeau
Committee in 1966 and enacted in 1974.37 The 1974 third party spending limits prohibited any expenditures during a campaign period that
directly promoted or opposed a candidate or political party, but provided
for a “good faith” exception. The good faith exception provided essentially that a third party that incurred expenses with respect to the promotion of an issue of public policy was protected so long as there was no
co-ordination or collusion with a candidate or political party. The good
faith exception was tested in a 1978 case where a union member hired a
plane to fly around the city of Ottawa towing a banner that said “O.H.C.
Employees 767 C.U.P.E. vote, but not Liberal.”38 The failure to secure a
conviction showed that the third party spending limits were toothless.
Parliament responded in 1983 by removing the good faith exception.39
37
Canada, Report of the Committee on Election Expenses (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966)
(Chair: Alphonse Barbeau); Election Expenses Act, S.C. 1974, c. 51.
38
R. v. Roach (1978), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 736, at 737 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
39
An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act (No. 3), S.C. 1983, c. 164.
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The prohibition on third party spending minus the good faith exception
was challenged by the National Citizen’s Coalition in one of the first
Charter section 2(b) cases.40 The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench struck
down the third party spending limits as an unjustifiable limit on freedom
of expression shortly before the 1984 federal election. The decision was
not appealed and no third party spending limits were enforced in either
the 1984 or 1988 elections.
The 1988 election was marked by significant third party spending
by proponents and opponents of the Free Trade Agreement between
Canada and the United States.41 In response to public concerns over the
political process and political finance, following the 1988 election the
Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing chaired by
Pierre Lortie was appointed. The Lortie Commission recommended in
1992 that third party spending limits be reinstituted and that the limits
apply to indirect as well as direct promotion or opposition of candidates
or political parties.42 The following year Parliament amended the Canada Elections Act to provide for a $1,000 spending limit for third parties
but did not broaden the limit to indirect promotion or opposition of
candidates or political parties.43 Shortly after the amendments, the National Citizens’ Coalition once again challenged the constitutionality of
third party spending limits. In 1996, the Alberta Court of Appeal struck
down the third party spending limits in Somerville v. Canada (Attorney
General) on the basis that the legislative objective was not pressing and
substantial.44 As a result of Somerville, the third party spending limits
were not enforced during the 1997 election.
The 1997 Supreme Court decision in Libman was a turning point.
The Court accepted that the purpose of political finance controls was
egalitarian and found the legislative objective behind the specific third
party spending limits in issue to be pressing and substantial. The Court
in Libman, however, went further to explicitly disagree with the Alberta
Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Somerville describing the purpose of the

40
National Citizens’ Coalition Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1984), 11 D.L.R. (4th)
481 (Alta. Q.B.).
41
Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, Vol. 1 (1991), at 337 [hereinafter “Final Report”].
42
Id., at 340.
43
An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 1993, c. 19, s. 259.
44
[1996] A.J. No. 515, 184 A.R. 241 (C.A.).
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Canada Elections Act’s political finance regime as “laudable.”45 Despite
finding the purpose of the legislation to be praiseworthy, the Court
struck down the specific limits in Quebec’s Referendum Act on the
grounds that they were not minimally impairing.
Following Libman, Parliament was emboldened to once again enact
third party spending limits. The CEA 2000 provided for two limits: a
$150,000 aggregate national limit and a $3,000 constituency limit. The
$150,000 national limit pertained to “election advertising,” defined as
communications that promote or oppose a particular candidate or party,
including communications that take “a position on an issue with which a
registered party or candidate is associated.”46 Parliament in the CEA
2000 essentially adopted the Lortie Commission’s recommendation to
regulate third party activities that indirectly promote candidates and
political parties. The definition of “election advertising,” unlike the
definitions that preceded it, does not require that communications that
promote or oppose a political party or candidate be direct. The $3,000
constituency limit applies to communications that promote or oppose
candidates by: “(a) naming them; (b) showing their likeness; (c) identifying them by their respective political affiliations; or (d) taking a position on an issue with which they are particularly associated.”47
2. The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
Shortly after the adoption of the CEA 2000, Stephen Harper, erstwhile president of the National Citizens’ Coalition and present leader of
the Conservative Party of Canada, commenced an action under section
2(b) and section 3 of the Charter to declare the new third party spending
limits and certain related provisions unconstitutional.48 After the trial,
but before a decision was rendered, a federal election was called. Harper
successfully moved before the trial judge for an injunction suspending
operation of the law.49 The injunction order was upheld by the Court of

45

Libman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, at para. 56.
Canada Elections Act, 2000, S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 319 [hereinafter “CEA 2000”].
47
CEA 2000, s. 350.
48
A violation of Charter s. 2(d) was also argued. The s. 2(d) arguments relate principally
to the anti-circumvention and anti-collusion provisions that support the third-party spending limits.
The s. 2(d) issues did not preoccupy any of the three Courts and will not be discussed in this paper.
49
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] A.J. No. 1226, 6 C.P.C. (5th) 362 (Q.B.).
46
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Appeal, but reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada approximately
halfway through the election campaign.50
The trial decision in Harper was released following the 2000 election. Justice Cairns did not find that the third party spending limits
violated section 3. Justice Cairns held, without the benefit of the Supreme Court’s more expansive views in Figueroa, that section 3 is principally concerned with representation, not information. The
informational component of the right to vote is ancillary to the right to
effective representation and accordingly guarantees the voter only “sufficient information.”51 Justice Cairns’ reasons make it clear that he
viewed third party spending limits as a freedom of expression problem,
not a democratic rights issue.
Justice Cairns held that the third party spending limits violated section 2(b) and was not saved under section 1. In arriving at this conclusion, Cairns J. distinguished the case from Libman. Justice Cairns’ way
around Libman was to find that the basis for the Lortie Commission’s
recommendations, upon which the Supreme Court in Libman had relied,
was a discredited research study.52 This same conclusion, together with
the government’s inability to provide other empirical evidence of harm
caused by third party advertising, led Cairns J. to conclude that the expenditure limits did not serve a pressing and substantial objective and
were therefore unconstitutional.
For the purposes of this paper, the most important part of Cairns J.’s
decision is his approach to two other aspects of section 1 of the Charter;
namely, his consideration of the definition of the word “associated” in
the context of the section 1 requirement that limits be “prescribed by
law” and in the context of his minimal impairment analysis and his
evaluation of the monetary limit chosen by Parliament in his minimal
impairment analysis. Justice Cairns found that the regulation of expression concerning issues “associated” with parties and candidates was
unconstitutionally vague and did not constitute a limit “prescribed by
law.” Justice Cairns added rhetorically:

50
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] A.J. No. 1240, 266 A.R. 262 (C.A.); Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] S.C.J. No. 58, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 764.
51
Harper (Q.B.), supra, note 5, at para. 133.
52
Id., at paras. 266-70, 273.
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Is a person being given fair notice of the conduct which is being
proscribed? With respect to the matter of issues which are “associated”
with a party or candidate, I find there is not fair notice. While one or
two issues may stand out in every election, parties and candidates
generally take a position on a host of issues. All of the major parties
will have positions on issues ranging from health care to constitutional
reform. A third party could take a position on an issue considering it to
be pure issue advertising, only to subsequently find out that Elections
Canada considers the issues to be “associated” or even “particularly
associated” with a party or candidate … thus running afoul of the
53
legislation. It is ill-defined.

Put differently, Cairns J. is concerned about the definition extending
beyond the underlying legislative objective.
Justice Cairns did not come to a conclusion concerning the appropriateness of the quantum of the spending limits. He explained that he
was “not in a position to determine what the appropriate numbers are
and some deference should be accorded to Parliament.”54 At the same
time, however, he noted that he was “troubled by the relatively low
numbers and the relatively limited amount of speech that can be engaged in by third parties within the limits.”55 Justice Cairns in any event
concluded that the spending limits were not minimally impairing for the
same reasons that he concluded that the limits were vague.
3. The Alberta Court of Appeal
(a) The Majority Decision of Paperny J.A.
Justice Paperny, writing for the majority of the Alberta Court of
Appeal, concurred with the trial judge that third party spending limits
did not offend section 3 of the Charter but that third party spending
limits violated section 2(b). The majority also agreed with the trial
judge’s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of harm arising
from third party electoral activities to support a finding that the legislative objective was pressing and substantial.56 Despite her conclusion,
53

Id., at para. 220.
Id., at para. 300.
55
Id., at para. 300.
56
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] A.J. No. 1542, 14 Alta. L.R. (4th) 4, at
para. 161 (C.A.) [hereinafter “Harper (C.A.)”].
54
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she undertook a full section 1 analysis. She approached her section 1
analysis on the basis that if she was incorrect with respect to her conclusion on the lack of a pressing and substantial objective, the lack of proof
of harm was nevertheless relevant to the standard of review to be applied. Indeed, she concluded that:
This is not a case where great deference is to be accorded to
Parliament’s objectives. As in Thomson Newspapers, when the
contextual factors indicate that the government has not established the
harm to be prevented is widespread or significant or when the group to
be protected is not historically vulnerable or disadvantaged, little
57
deference should be shown.

Justice Paperny’s strict standard of review is most evident in her consideration of whether or not the third party spending limits were minimally
impairing.
On the section 1 threshold question of vagueness, Paperny J.A. disagreed with Cairns J. as to whether the limit was “prescribed by law.”
Despite conceding the fact that “‘association’ cannot be defined a priori
with precision,” Paperny J.A. concluded that “it is possible to determine
when third party messages bear sufficient resemblance to political party
and candidate policies that they come under the administration of the
Elections Act 2000.”58 Justice Paperny, following the usual practice of
Canadian courts, preferred to consider the definitional question as part
of her minimal impairment analysis.59
Justice Paperny’s minimal impairment analysis focused on two separate problems. First, she considered the quantum of the third party
limits. To Paperny J.A., it was clear that in many cases the electoral
district limit of $3,000 “renders even minimally effective third party
advertising nugatory. A scheme that so restricts freedom of expression
to make it ineffectual is equivalent to an absolute ban.”60 She also concluded that:
57
58
59

Id., at para. 135.
Id., at para. 58.
R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] S.C.J. No. 67, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, at

627:
The Court will be reluctant to find a disposition so vague as not to qualify as “law”
under s. 1 in limine, and will rather consider the scope of the disposition under the “minimal
impairment” test.
60
Harper (C.A.), supra, note 56, at para. 176.
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the $150,000 overall limit, even if perfectly apportioned at $3,000
among districts, only allows spending in 50 constituencies.… Or by
another calculation, $150,000 divided among 298 constituencies
provides for little over $503 per constituency. The total limit appears
61
to amount to a ban on nationwide advertising.

Foreshadowing the language used in Figueroa, Paperny J.A. concluded
that such stringent limits were unjustifiable because it precluded citizens
from “meaningful expression.”62
Justice Paperny’s conclusion that the spending limits were too miserly is unremarkable. What is much more interesting is that she identified the problem of limiting issue advocacy:
The Elections Act 2000 [third party spending limits] include those who
simply want to raise the profile of an issue regardless of political
affiliations. By including such expressions in the legislation, the
infringement of rights goes beyond what is necessary to control
election financing by encroaching upon the freedom of expression of
those who seek to voice public concerns which are inconsequential to
partisan advocacy. As such, the legislation cannot pass the minimal
63
impairment analysis.

Even more clearly than Cairns J., Paperny J.A. appreciates that the stated underlying legislative objective does not extend to non-partisan expression concerning issues during an election period. Essentially what
Paperny J.A. concluded was that even if there was a pressing and substantial objective, it did not justify the regulation of third party pure
issue advocacy. As will be discussed below, the Supreme Court in Harper entirely missed this point.
(b) The Dissenting Decision of Berger J.A.
Justice Berger’s dissenting reasons begin with a discussion of the
dialogue theory of judicial review. Dialogue theory has particular resonance in the context of third party spending limits because of the give
and take between the courts and Parliament over third party spending

61
62
63

Id., at para. 177.
Id., at para. 178.
Id.,. at para. 184.
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limits in the CEA and between the courts and provincial legislatures
with respect to similar legislation. Justice Berger was careful to note that
the Supreme Court in Sauvé pointed out that “the dialogue metaphor
does not signal a lowering of the s. 1 justification standard.”64 At the
same time, however, he framed the question before the Court in Harper
to be “whether the response of the Parliament of Canada in enacting the
Canada Elections Act 2000 is properly respectful of the Charter values
identified by the Supreme Court of Canada in Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General).”65 Dialogue in this case may not have led directly to Berger J.A. adopting a deferential stance in principle; however, indirectly
the idea that inquiry was limited to whether the legislative response was
consistent with Libman suggests a lower standard of review in practice.
Justice Berger confronted the definitional issue in the context of the
threshold question of whether the third party spending limits were “prescribed by law” rather than in his minimal impairment analysis. Justice
Berger, unlike the trial judge, Paperny J.A., or the Supreme Court, offered a suggestion as to how a court might deal with the indeterminacy
of the word “associated” if actually confronted with an alleged violation
of the third party spending limts. Justice Berger suggested that “[t]he
relevant inquiry … will be whether a reasonable person would perceive
that third party election advertising takes a position on an issue that is
particularly associated with a registered political party or candidate.”66
The addition of a reasonableness qualification goes some way to resolving the vagueness of the word “associated,” but it does not necessarily
reduce the breadth of the definition. Justice Berger, however, did not
address the question of definitional overbreadth in his minimal impairment analysis.
Justice Berger also took a different approach from the majority to
the balance of his section 1 analysis. To Berger J.A., the question of
proof was not important. Instead, he found the legislative objective
behind third party limits to be pressing and substantial according to the
following logic. First, the justification for the political finance regime in
the abstract was consistent with other Charter rights. Indeed, the legislative purpose of the CEA had been said by the Supreme Court in Libman

64
65
66

Id., at para. 199, quoting Sauvé, supra, note 23, at para. 104.
Id., at para. 200.
Id., at para. 227.
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to be “laudable.”67 Second, properly understood, the limits on third party
spending were designed to prevent damage to the larger political finance
regime by stopping an avenue for circumvention of candidate and political party spending limits. He concluded:
The provisions at issue are part of the overall objective of
Parliament to ensure a fair electoral system. The “harm” posed by
unregulated third party spending is the damage done to the regime of
fairness and equity created and maintained by party and candidate
spending limits. Limiting third party spending is essential to
preserving the integrity of the existing scheme of electoral finance
68
controls.

Justice Berger went on to conclude that: “[t]he fact that the Lortie
Commission concluded that its own limit of $1,000 for all third party
election expenditures would satisfy the minimal impairment test speaks
strongly in favour of the minimal impairment validity of the provision
adopted by Parliament.”69
4. The Supreme Court
(a) The Majority Decision of Bastarache J.
The majority decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, written by
Bastarache J., begins with an affirmation and elaboration of the political
theory articulated in Libman. The majority of the Court in Harper
adopted my term “egalitarian model” to describe an approach to the
regulation of elections that draws on the political theory of John Rawls
and other liberal theorists who have participated in the U.S. campaign
finance reform debates over the past 40 years.70 The egalitarian model,
Bastarache J., explains “is premised on the notion that individuals
should have an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process.
Under this model, wealth is the main obstacle to equal participation.”71
Justice Bastarache went on to explain that the State may implement the

67
68
69
70
71

Libman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, at para. 56.
Harper (C.A.), supra, note 56, at para. 261.
Id., at para. 270.
Feasby, “The Emerging Egalitarian Model,” supra, note 3, at 9-17.
Harper (S.C.C.), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, at para. 62.
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egalitarian model by funding candidates and political parties and by
restricting “voices which dominate the political discourse so that others
may be heard as well.”72 The Harper majority makes it clear that the
principles set out in Libman and contested by the Alberta courts are now
the orthodox position in Canada.
With the esoteric question of political theory behind him,
Bastarache J. tackled the more terrestrial issue of whether the impugned
sections of the CEA 2000 contravened sections 2(b) and 3 of the Charter. Justice Bastarache began with section 3. Section 3, as the Court
recently articulated in Figueroa, guarantees citizens the right to “meaningful participation” in the electoral process.73 A violation of section 3
will be found only when a citizen’s right to meaningful participation has
been compromised. In the context of spending limits, Bastarache J.
stated the problem as follows:
Spending limits … must be carefully tailored to ensure that
candidates, political parties and third parties are able to convey their
information to voters. Spending limits which are overly restrictive may
undermine the informational component of the right to vote. To
constitute an infringement of the right to vote, these spending limits
would have to restrict information in such a way as to undermine the
right of citizens to meaningfully participate in the political process and
74
to be effectively represented.

In Figueroa, the Court found that the inability of small political parties to issue tax receipts to donors and the inability of small party candidates to be identified by party affiliation on ballots infringed citizens’
right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.75 The restrictions in Figueroa were clearly unfair to small political parties and
their candidates, but they stopped far short of precluding participation in
the political process. Despite Figueroa’s seemingly low threshold for
finding that citizens’ right to meaningful participation had been compromised, Bastarache J. concluded that the impugned third party spending limits did not violate section 3. After noting that the trial judge
found that third parties were precluded from mounting an “effective

72
73
74
75

Id., at para. 62.
Figueroa, [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, at para. 26.
Harper (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 73.
Figueroa, supra, note 73, at paras. 54 and 58.
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persuasive campaign,” he dismissively concluded that, “[m]eaningful
participation in elections is not synonymous with the ability to mount a
media campaign capable of determining the outcome.”76
The Court’s analysis in relation to the alleged violation of the right
to freedom of expression took place entirely in the context of section 1.
Perhaps what is most notable about the Harper majority is that section 1
analysis is the deferential approach. Justice Bastarache, citing Thomson
Newspapers, looked to contextual factors to determine the appropriate
degree of deference.77 The contextual factors considered were: (i) the
nature of the harm and the inability to measure it; (ii) vulnerability of
the group; (iii) subjective fears and apprehension of harm; and (iv) the
nature of the infringed activity — political expression. The last contextual factor appears to have had the most impact on Bastarache J.; it is
here where he contemplated the egalitarian model. According to
Bastarache J.:
Under the egalitarian model of elections, Parliament must balance
the rights and privileges of the participants in the electoral process:
candidates, political parties, third parties and voters…. Given the right
of Parliament to choose Canada’s electoral model and the nuances
inherent in implementing this model, the Court must approach the
justification analysis with deference…. In the end, the electoral
system, which regulates many aspects of an election, including its
duration and the control and reimbursement of expenses, reflects a
78
political choice, the details of which are better left to Parliament.

Justice Bastarache appears to have predicated his deference to Parliament not on a conception of dialogue, but in large part on an innate
sense that Parliament is in a better position than the Court to regulate the
political process and, in this case, political expression.
The majority identified three pressing and substantial objectives
served by the third party expenditure limits: (i) to promote equality in
the political discourse; (ii) to protect the integrity of the financing regime applicable to candidates and parties; and (iii) to maintain confidence in the electoral process. Justice Bastarache’s three objectives
capture the customary arguments made in favour of third party expendi76
77
78

Harper (S.C.C.), supra, note 71, at para. 74.
Id., at para. 76.
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ture limits. To some degree these objectives are different aspects of the
same objective. The second objective — protecting the integrity of the
political finance regime — only matters because the political finance regime fosters the first objective — promoting equality in the political discourse. The third objective — maintaining confidence in the political
process — is only relevant if there is a general consensus that promotion
of equality in the political discourse is normatively desirable. These
overlapping objectives are all, to one extent or another, derivative of the
case for the egalitarian model — the same model upon which
Bastarache J. predicated his deferential approach to section 1.
The majority’s minimal impairment analysis began with an obligatory recitation of the prescription in RJR-MacDonald that a law must be
“carefully tailored” but that “[i]f the law falls within a range of reasonable alternatives, the courts will not find it overbroad merely because
they can conceive of an alternative which might better tailor objective to
infringement.”79 With this in mind, the majority identified two contextual factors to support the view that the third party spending limits were
set at an appropriate level. First, Bastarache J. noted that there are few
obstacles to individuals joining political parties or creating political
parties. Presumably, this point was highlighted to suggest that despite
the third party spending limits there remain channels through which
political views may be expressed during an election. Second, he noted
that “lack of means, not legislative restrictions” was the primary obstacle for most individuals even under the third party expenditure limits.80
While Bastarache J. resisted the suggestion of the minority that he was
arguing that “since the breach of s. 2(b) only affects a few people, it is
therefore justifiable,” such a conclusion is hard to escape. Justice
Bastarache took a similar approach to the definitional question, to the
extent that he dealt with it at all. He noted that the definition of “election
advertising” does not apply to a number of forms of communications
such as editorials, debates, speeches, interviews, columns, letters, commentary, the news, and non-commercial use of the Internet. These exclusions, according to Bastarache J., are “highly effective means of
conveying information.”81 Justice Bastarache went on to conclude that
79
Id., at para. 110 quoting RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3
S.C.R. 199, at para. 160.
80
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not only were the limits “minimally impairing” but that they “allow for
meaningful participation in the electoral process and encourage informed voting. The limits promote a free and democratic society.”82
(b) The Minority Decision of McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J.
The minority judgment, written by McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J.,
differs from the majority reasons both in substance and in tone. Like
Bastarache J., the minority judgment accepts Libman as having settled
the question of the legitimacy of the legislative objective. In this respect,
McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. are deferential to Parliament. Unlike
Bastarache J., however, the minority did not find that Parliament was
owed any particular deference in the electoral arena with respect to the
means by which it chose to address its objectives. Harkening back to
Libman, McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. observed that “Here, too, Parliament’s good faith is advanced, said to be evidenced by the ongoing
dialogue with the courts as to where the limits should be set. But as in
Libman, good faith cannot remedy an impairment of the right to freedom of expression.”83
The minority’s lack of deference throughout the proportionality
analysis, though most obviously in its consideration of minimal impairment, is founded on two pillars. First, the minority clearly appreciates in
a way that the majority did not that third parties may bring perspectives
to the electoral debate that candidates and political parties do not. Moreover, quite apart from an individual’s interest in expressing himself,
“[p]ermitting an effective voice for unpopular and minority views —
views political parties may not embrace — is essential to deliberative
democracy.”84 In other words, from a structural perspective third parties
play a unique and valuable role. Chief Justice McLachlin and Major J.
further explained that:
It is no answer to say that the citizen can speak through a registered
political party. The citizen may hold views not espoused by a
registered party. The citizen has a right to communicate those views.
The right to do so is essential to the effective debate upon which our

82
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democracy rests, and lies at the core of the freedom of expression
guarantee. That does not mean that the right cannot be limited. But it
does mean that limits on it must be supported by clear and convincing
demonstration that they are necessary, do not go too far, and enhance
85
more than harm the democratic process.

The second pillar supporting the minority’s lack of deference, which
is also evident in the preceding quotation, is the overriding importance
of political expression. Whatever the legitimacy of Parliament’s objective, the importance of political expression demands that a critical assessment be made of Parliament’s chosen means to achieve the
objective. According to the minority, a lack of deference was particularly appropriate given that the problem addressed by the third party
spending limits was only hypothetical.86
The minority did not consider at length the vagueness or
overbreadth of the third party spending limits. Instead, McLachlin
C.J.C. and Major J. understood the limits to have the broadest possible
application because of the wide array of issues with which candidates
and political parties are typically associated.87 For the minority, the
debate over issue advocacy was irrelevant because of its conclusion that
there was no evidence that indicated that partisan third party advocacy
was a problem. The broad definition of “associated” together with the
meagre monetary limits prescribed by the third party spending limits led
the minority to conclude that “the problem … is that the draconian nature of the infringement — to effectively deprive all those who do not or
cannot speak through political parties of their voice during an election
period — overshoots the perceived danger.”88
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IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
1. The Limits of the Egalitarian Model
(a) The Duality of Third Parties in the Electoral Debate and the
Motives for Regulation
Viewed from a structural perspective, third parties can play both an
important role and a dangerous role in the political process. Some third
parties are an important catalyst for debate while others may be little
more than a device for evading the political finance regime. An ideal
regulation of third party spending would facilitate third parties’ debate
catalyst function and limit the propensity of third parties to destabilize
the political finance regime. The duality of third parties in the political
process is an essential part of the context that must be understood when
considering the constitutionality of third party spending limits. The
duality of third parties, however, is inadequately understood by the
majority in Harper.
The political finance regime’s egalitarian objectives can be justified
on the grounds it is reasonable to assume that over time that third party
advocacy activities will be biased toward the interests of private wealth.
Essentially, private wealth enjoys an advantage in agenda setting. Such
a threat is not as direct a threat to inequality as political contributions to
candidates and political parties. Furthermore, the argument that private
wealth can dominate agenda setting through third party expenditures,
however logical, is not substantiated by empirical evidence. The most
immediate and direct threat posed by third parties to political equality is
to the integrity of the political finance regime. Third party activities
imperil the political finance regime by threatening to undermine the
relative deliberative equality among candidates and political parties. The
political finance regime creates a context within which major parties and
their candidates and even to some extent minor parties and their candidates are ensured a rough parity of resources through public funding and
free broadcasting and are subject to similar expenditure limits. Campaigns by third parties may intentionally or unintentionally parallel
political party campaigns in message and objective. In an environment
where third party expenditures are not controlled, a third party communications campaign that promotes or opposes a candidate or political
party may threaten the integrity of candidate and political party spending limits by creating an incentive for avoidance on the part of the targeted candidate or political party. Such avoidance might take the form
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of non-compliance with candidate and political party spending limits or
through a responding third party attack. Essentially, the involvement of
a third party can upset the détente imposed by the Elections Act and
prompt an arms race between candidates and political parties. Even if
avoidance of the political finance regime does not become widespread,
the perception of unfairness may result in the repeal of third party
spending limits. Either result jeopardizes the larger egalitarian mission
of the political finance regime.
Candidates and political parties may, from time to time, have a
common interest in not debating a particular issue. Such a common
interest may stem from an issue being perceived as a “loser” for all
candidates and parties, or perhaps it is an issue that is “too hot to handle,” or it may be that the issue concerns an aspect of the political process itself such as Parliamentary pensions and salaries. Third parties,
unlike candidates and political parties, are not inhibited from raising
controversial subjects by concern for their electoral fate nor do they
have a vested interest in the political process itself. Third parties are,
therefore, uniquely positioned to criticize the status quo and the shared
values of candidates and political parties. For example, third parties can
effectively attack government waste and corruption in a way that candidates and political parties cannot or will not. When third parties function
in this manner they broaden political discourse and enhance the value of
citizens’ democratic rights. Accepting that the regulation of third party
electoral activities is egalitarian in purpose does not mean that there are
no other legislative motives at play. Candidates and political parties,
particularly incumbents, share a common interest in reducing the chances of the unexpected. Safe campaigns serve the interests of candidates
and political parties, not citizens. The catalyst function of third parties
that is so vital to enhancing political debate is also a potentially destabilizing force in a campaign. The possibility that legislators might be
tempted by self-interest to enact third party spending limits that are
more stringent than are necessary to serve the egalitarian objectives of
the political finance regime cannot be discounted.
(b) Issue Advocacy
Third party electoral communications can be divided into two general types: partisan advocacy and issue advocacy. Partisan advocacy, as
the term suggests, refers to communications that expressly promote or
oppose a candidate or political party. Partisan advocacy is the type of
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third party activity that poses a threat to the integrity of the larger political finance regime. Issue advocacy refers to communications concerning
issues, not candidates or political parties. Issue advocacy, as it has come
to be understood in the United States, can itself be divided into two
categories: “pure” issue advocacy and “sham” issue advocacy.89 In practice, the distinction between pure and sham issue advocacy is not always
easy to make.
Pure issue advocacy is electoral communications that do not seek to
persuade a listener to vote for or against a particular candidate or political party. An example of pure issue advocacy from the 2000 federal
election is “Canada’s Health Care,” an advertisement placed by the
Canadian Medical Association in The Globe and Mail and which read as
follows:
Canada’s Health Care: Planning a Full Recovery
Join with Canada’s physicians to help make [the Canadian Medical
Association’s ideas for a better health care system] a reality, by letting
your voice be heard during this election. [Here are] some things that
you can do:
1.

Send your idea of an ideal health care system to us. We’ll post
them on our web-site, and send them all to Canada’s political
leaders.

2.

Tell your local candidates about the health system you want, and
ask what they’ll do to make it happen.

3.

Write, email, phone hot line shows, go to meetings, and then
90
make your vote count.

No issue advocacy can be wholly neutral. The CMA’s “Canada’s
Healthcare” was undoubtedly more consistent with some political par-

89
See Hasen, “The Surprisingly Complex Case,” supra, note 4. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) gave rise to the distinction between issue advocacy
and partisan advocacy. The divide between issue advocacy and partisan advocacy was assumed by
many to have constitutional significance. The Court, however, upheld issue advocacy restrictions in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). For comment on the treatment of
issue advocacy in McConnell see: R. Hasen, “The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy” (2004) 3 Election L.J. 251.
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ties’ positions in the 2000 federal election than others. Even so, the
advertisement is non-partisan. Issue advocacy fundamentally differs
from partisan advocacy in that its primary objective is promotion of
political debate, not promotion of or opposition to a candidate or political party.
Sham issue advocacy is, like its name suggests, not really issue advocacy at all. Sham issue advocacy is thinly-veiled partisan advocacy.
Advertisements that describe an issue in the context of a candidate or
political party’s position on the issue and portrays that position in either
a positive or negative light are sham issue advocacy. A classic example
of sham issue advocacy was placed by the Grand Council for the Crees
in The Globe and Mail two days prior to the 2000 federal election:
I Encourage Aboriginal Citizens to Vote in the Federal Election.
Jean Chretien’s Liberal Platform
1.

continue to work with aboriginal peoples to address the economic
and social problems they face;

2.

promote aboriginal languages;

3.

build and strengthen relations with aboriginal peoples;

4.

promote aboriginal economic skill development and prosperous
aboriginal economies.

Stockwell Day’s plans for us we all know.
Gilles Duceppe’s agenda for aboriginals in Canada is also well known.
***
By voting we may determine decisions that will impact the future of
our peoples. Voting is one expression of our right of self91
determination.

The explanation of Jean Chretien’s program in positive terms and the
programs of Stockwell Day and Gilles Duceppe in dismissive terms

91
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clearly indicated that Aboriginal citizens should not only vote, but vote
Liberal.
If the dual nature of third parties in the political process and the distinction between pure and issue advocacy are accepted, it may be concluded that in the abstract there is a case for limiting sham issue
advocacy, but little or no case for limiting pure issue advocacy. Partisan
advocacy and sham issue advocacy pose a threat to the stability of other
political finance controls, while issue advocacy primarily enables third
parties to be catalysts for expanded political debate. The only argument
for regulating pure issue advocacy is pragmatic; essentially, it must be
argued that it is impossible to intelligently distinguish between sham
issue advocacy and pure issue advocacy.92 This argument was not considered by the Supreme Court in Harper.
(c) The Paradox of Political Expression in Elections
Political expression in elections, even before the Charter, was recognized to be perhaps the most essential form of expression. Chief Justice Duff, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in
the Alberta Press case observed:
Under the constitution established by The British North America Act,
legislative power for Canada is vested in one Parliament consisting of
the Sovereign, an upper house styled the Senate, and the House of
Commons….. The statute contemplates a parliament working under
the influence of public opinion and public discussion. There can be no
controversy that such institutions derive their efficacy from the free
public discussion of affairs, from criticism and answer and countercriticism, from attack upon policy and administration and defence and
counter-attack; from the freest and fullest analysis and examination
from every point of view of political proposals. This is signally true in
respect of the discharge … by members of Parliament of their duty to
the electors, and by the electors themselves of their responsibilities in
93
the election of their representatives.
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The idea that political expression is “core expression” is a recurring
theme in Charter section 2(b) cases. The clearest articulation of this
view is found in Dickson C.J.’s remarks in Keegstra where he noted
that: “The connection between freedom of expression and the political
process is perhaps the linchpin of the s. 2(b) guarantee, and the nature of
this connection is largely derived from the Canadian commitment to
democracy.”94 The importance of political expression, in most instances,
would seem to override competing legislative objectives.
The potential problem of wealth dominating the political agenda exists outside the electoral context. This concern, however, is not sufficient to justify limits on political expression outside an election period.
Accordingly, egalitarian concerns alone do not explain the reason for a
deferential approach to the regulation of electoral expression. A necessary complement to egalitarian principles is the idea that political expression is too important not to be regulated in some respects during
elections. This is the paradox of political expression in elections. Political expression in election campaigns is so closely connected to the exercise of democratic rights that concern about improper influence on
debate is heightened. Electoral expression is fundamentally different
than normal political discourse in that it takes place within a defined
time period, is subject to myriad rules, and is ancillary to an expressive
act — voting — that is both highly regulated and constitutionally protected. Elections are an artificial context created for a specific purpose
and dependent on State action.95 Edwin Baker expressed this argument
in the following terms:
elections are part of a formal, legally structured realm of the
governmental apparatus. Campaign speech is a central part of this
electoral realm. For this reason, campaign speech must be
distinguished from the much broader category of political speech or
96
speech about public issues.

Frederick Schauer and Richard Pildes term this argument “electoral
exceptionalism”:
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According to electoral exceptionalism, elections should be
constitutionally understood as (relatively) bounded domains of
communicative activity. Because of the defined scope of this activity,
it would be possible to prescribe or apply First Amendment principles
to electoral processes that do not necessarily apply through the full
reach of the First Amendment. If electoral exceptionalism prevails,
courts evaluating restrictions on speech that is part of the process of
nominating and electing candidates would employ a different standard
from what we might otherwise characterize as the normal, or baseline,
97
degree of First Amendment scrutiny.

The great danger of the electoral exceptionalism argument is that it may
be applied too broadly. If electoral exceptionalism is indeed central to
the Court’s reasoning in Harper and it is accepted that political expression is as important as the Court explained in the Alberta Press case and
in Keegstra, then the Court should be careful to limit its application to
electoral expression. Political expression outside the electoral context
cannot be limited on the grounds that the limit somehow improves electoral debate. To cabin the electoral exceptionalism argument the Court
must draw a line between political expression generally and electoral
expression. It may be impossible to draw a bright line, but every effort
must be made to limit electoral exceptionalism to its proper context.
(d) The Margins of the Electoral Context and the Failure of the Court
in Harper
The Court in Harper explicitly accepted the egalitarian model and
seemingly accepted the basic premise of the electoral exceptionalism
argument. The Court concluded its explanation why deference to Parliament was appropriate by stating that: “In the end, the electoral system, which regulates many aspects of an election, including its duration
and the control and reimbursement of expenses, reflects a political
choice, the details of which are better left to Parliament.”98 While this is
not an explicit endorsement of electoral exceptionalism, it certainly
appears to be an acceptance of the view that elections are an artificial
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end-driven context within which limits on what would otherwise be core
expression are necessary and expected.
Accepting for the moment that deference is warranted in the electoral context, the most obvious problems with the third party expenditure limit in the CEA 2000 are definitional. There are two doctrinal
rubrics under which the definitional problems with CEA 2000 third
party spending limits can be considered: vagueness and overbreadth.
Vagueness and definitional overbreadth are closely related concepts. A
vague law is a threat to the rule of law because it creates the risk of
arbitrary and capricious enforcement.99 A law must be sufficiently clear
that it gives citizens fair warning so that they may govern their conduct
so as to comply with the law. Definitional overbreadth presents a similar
danger in that a law that is overbroad is susceptible to enforcement
according to unstated and arbitrary principles. The classic example is a
law prohibiting loitering that is enforced against teenage males at night,
but not against parishioners mingling outside Church on a Sunday morning.100 In the Charter context, vagueness is considered as a threshold
question under section 1 where the Court asks the question whether a
provision is a “limit prescribed by law.” Overbreadth is typically considered a question of minimal impairment under the section 1 proportionality analysis. For the purposes of this paper and consideration of the
limits of the electoral exceptionalism argument, the relevant concern is
not vagueness, but definitional overbreadth. In particular, the question is
to what extent the breadth of the third party spending limits exceed the
underlying legislative objective.
Canadian courts have been reluctant to find laws vague. Instead,
courts are inclined to give laws their most plausible meaning, which is
often the broadest meaning possible, and to consider whether the law is
overbroad in the context of the minimal impairment analysis. The Court
in Harper followed this approach as it confronted the definitional problems with the third party spending limits. The Court held: “[w]hether the
definition is impermissibly broad is a matter for legal debate and is more
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properly considered at the minimal impairment stage of the justification
analysis.”101
By postponing consideration of difficult definitional questions to the
minimal impairment stage of its analysis, the Court risks avoiding a
reckoning with the true meaning of a statutory provision. Indeed, the
majority in Harper never returns to the definitional question in its minimal impairment analysis.102 The Court’s discussion of minimal impairment is almost entirely concerned with whether the financial limits were
set at the appropriate levels. No consideration is given to the question of
the definitional breadth of the third party spending limits. The question
of whether non-electoral political expression is captured is not considered nor is the question of whether the law exceeded the underlying
legislative objective addressed.
When contemplating the breadth of the third party restrictions in the
CEA 2000, the Court should have, at a minimum, considered the context
within which third parties operate. The most obvious contextual issue is:
How broad is the limit in practice? In other words, is there any unregulated space during an election campaign and, if so, how much? The
majority did not explicitly consider the breadth of the provision in the
context of determining whether the third party spending limits were
prescribed by law; however, certain comments suggest that the majority
considered the limit to apply to something less than all political expression during an election period. In particular, the majority noted that
“[w]hile no specific criteria exist, it is possible to determine whether an
issue is associated with a candidate or political party and, therefore, to
delineate an area of risk. For example, it is possible to discern whether
an issue is associated with a candidate or political party from their platform.”103
The majority’s implicit view that the third party spending limit extended to something less than all political expression during an election
campaign, was rejected by the minority. The minority, unlike the majority, turns its mind to how elections really work:
Section 350(2)(d) is particularly restrictive. It prohibits individuals
from spending more than the allowed amounts on any issue with
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which a candidate is “particularly associated.” The candidates in an
election are typically associated with a wide range of views on a wide
range of issues. The evidence shows that the effect of the limits is to
prevent citizens from effectively communicating their views on issues
104
during an election campaign.

The minority probably understates the breadth of the third party spending limits in practice. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a political issue during an election that is not “associated” or even “particularly associated”
with a political party or candidate. If the minority’s understanding of the
definition of the third party spending limitation is accepted, it is impossible to conclude anything other than that the definition exceeds the
scope of the underlying legislative objective. The definitional breadth of
the third party spending limits is every bit as much of a constitutional
problem as the modest financial limits.
There are two other contextual considerations that illustrate the
overbroad and capricious nature of the third party spending restriction
and that escaped the Court’s notice. First, elections may arise unexpectedly and wrong foot third parties with regularly scheduled advertising
campaigns. Third parties, as the Court noted,105 may advertise without
restriction prior to the commencement of an electoral period. One of the
central features of our Parliamentary system, however, is that there are
no set election dates. Consider for a moment the predicament of a hypothetical third party that invested funds in excess of the permitted
amounts to develop an advertising campaign and purchased significant
television broadcasting time several months in advance. After the third
party’s investment in developing the campaign with an advertising
agency and purchase of television time, but before the campaign runs on
television an election is called for the period in which the third party
advertising campaign was planned. A third party in such a situation has
two choices: (1) break the law and run its campaign; or (2) delay or
cancel its campaign and suffer a financial loss. Neither of these alternatives are fair to an individual or organization complying with the law
prior to the issue of the election writ.
Second, consider the predicament of a third party that plans an advertising campaign during an election period in excess of the prescribed
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financial limits on an issue that is not associated with a political party or
particularly associated with any candidate. The hypothetical third party
invests its resources in preparing the advertising campaign and purchasing broadcast time or advertising space in a publication. However, in the
midst of the campaign and before the third party is able to run its advertisements, a political party announces that it adopts the third party’s
issue as its own thus becoming “associated” with the issue. Just as in the
case of the third party surprised by an election, a third party whose issue
is usurped by a political party in mid-campaign is potentially in violation of the third party expenditure limits. This hypothetical example is
not a remote possibility. Indeed, the emergence of issues over a campaign period is part of the ordinary function of democratic debate. Issues
are not frozen in place at the commencement of a campaign or even in
the platform documents of the various political parties.
2. Political Process Theory
(a) Process Theory and Political Markets
One of the great debates in constitutional theory in the 20th century
was over the question of whether judicial review was democratic. Is it
legitimate for an appointed Court to invalidate laws passed by a democratically elected legislature? Alexander Bickel famously termed this
quandary the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”106 The short answer to
this problem in the Canadian context is that Canada is not a pure democracy; it is a constitutional democracy. The Supreme Court made this
abundantly clear in the Secession Reference where it outlined four principles — democracy, federalism, respect for minority rights, and constitutionalism and the rule of law — that together define Canada’s political
being.107 Even if we accept that the big question posed by Bickel and
others has been answered by the Court, the practical question of the
relationship between Parliament and the Court remains. To what extent
can the Court interfere with Parliament’s choices? And to what extent
should the Court respect Parliament’s choices?
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One approach to reconciling judicial review with democracy that
has largely been overlooked in Canada is process theory. Process theories, such as that of John Hart Ely, hold that the U.S. Constitution (and
for the sake of argument we will assume that this statement applies
equally to the Constitution of Canada) is fundamentally democratic. All
process theories hold, in essence, that a Constitution should be principally a guarantee of procedural fairness and that the Court’s role is to
enforce that guarantee. If Courts enforce a guarantee of procedural fairness, it is often argued, substantively fair results will inevitably follow.
By enforcing a process guarantee instead of deciding cases based on
substantive values, the Court respects the democratic will of the legislature to make normative choices.
Ely’s process theory was inspired by the fourth footnote in United
States v. Carolene Products Co.108 The footnote itself is not clearly
expressed and is subject to interpretation. A general consensus, however, has emerged through extensive academic debate that the footnote
provides essentially that there should be little deference shown in review
of three types of legislation: (1) laws that infringe textually enumerated
constitutional rights; (2) legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation; and (3) laws that discriminate on the basis of race,
religion, or national origin.109
The famous footnote has been credited by some as articulating the
post-New Deal approach to judicial review. Owen Fiss, for example,
called the footnote “the great and modern charter for ordering the rela-
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operation of these political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
109
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tion between judges and other agencies of government.”110 The footnote’s fame is in no small part due to Ely making it the centrepiece of
his process theory.
Ely called his approach to judicial review a “representationreinforcing theory.”111 What Ely meant by this was that the Court should
concern “itself only with questions of participation, and not with the
substantive merits of the political choice under attack.”112 While “participation” is a vague notion, Ely made it clear that he envisioned the Court
as functioning in the political sphere much like the Competition Tribunal in the economic domain combating monopolistic behaviour. As Ely
explained:
[t]he approach to constitutional adjudication recommended here is
akin to what might be called an “antitrust” as opposed to a
“regulatory” orientation to economic affairs — rather than dictate
substantive results it intervenes only when the “market,” in our case
the political market, is systemically malfunctioning. (A referee
analogy is also not far off: the referee is to intervene only when one
team is gaining unfair advantage, not because the “wrong” team has
scored.)… Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of
trust, when (1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change
to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though
no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to
an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority
out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize
commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the
113
protection afforded other groups by a representative system.

Participation, to Ely, is enhanced by preventing the “ins” from manipulating the political system in their favour. He went on to explain that a
court is much better placed than a legislature to determine when there is
a malfunction in the political market. Ely remarked, “[o]bviously our
elected representatives are the last persons we should trust with identification of either of these situations.”114
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Ely’s work grappled with the Warren Court’s minority rights jurisprudence and, particularly, those decisions concerning minority rights in
the political process. Ely’s process theory, for all its promise, did not
elaborate in any detail how courts should approach political process
questions generally. His “work remained relatively undeveloped regarding the application of process theory to the core functioning of the political process, an inquiry that has advanced significantly since the
emergence of the study of political governance as a distinct inquiry in
constitutional law.”115 Indeed, as noted in the second part of this paper,
one of the notable developments in the study of law and the democratic
process has been the revival of process theory.
The most notable extension of Ely’s process theory to emerge from
the body of law and the democratic process scholarship is the “political
markets” approach advocated by Samuel Issacharoff and Richard
Pildes.116 Issacharoff and Pildes adopted a competition-based model, but
did not use Ely’s anti-trust analogy. Instead, they preferred to conceive
of elected representatives as analogous to corporate managers. The
problem of management entrenchment in corporate law through the use
of “poison pills,” “break fees,” and super-majority requirements, they
argued, is no different than political representatives entrenching themselves through gerrymanders, political finance laws, or other regulations
of the political process. To support this view, Issacharoff and Pildes
drew upon public choice scholarship that concluded that the “legislative
process [is] an arena for fundamentally self-serving behavior.”117 While
such a dim view of human nature is undoubtedly incorrect in many
individual cases, as a generalization it delineates a genuine structural
risk.
Corporate law deals with the risk of self-serving behaviour and entrenchment by managers in two ways. First, the law imposes fiduciary
obligations on directors and officers. Second, the law favours conditions
that support open contests for control. According to Issacharoff and
Pildes, this latter means of shaping the behaviour of corporate managers
is the most instructive for the study of law and the democratic process.
They explained their approach in the following terms:
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[P]olitics shares with all markets a vulnerability to anticompetitive
behavior. In political markets, anticompetitive entities alter the rules of
engagement to protect established powers from the risk of successful
challenge. This market analogy may be pushed one step further if we
view elected officials and dominant parties as a managerial class,
imperfectly accountable through periodic review to a diffuse body of
equity holders known as the electorate.
Like the managerial class well-known to the laws of corporate
governance, these political managers readily identify their stewardship
with the interests of the corporate body they lead. Like their corporate
counterparts, they act in the name of the entity to protect themselves
against outside challenges to their personal authority. Again, like their
corporate counterparts, political managers use procedural devices,
118
created in their incumbent capacity, to lock up their control.

Issacharoff and Pildes concluded that a structural approach to judicial
review — ensuring that political markets are competitive — is preferable to an individual rights approach to judicial review. This conclusion
has been controversial,119 but is not essential for the position advanced
in this paper. Instead, it is enough to take from the political markets
approach that judicial review must be guided, at least in part, by a sensitivity to the threat posed by self-serving behaviour by legislators. By
making a link to two unrelated disciplines, public choice scholarship
and corporate law, political markets provide a more detailed and compelling account than Ely why politicians should be distrusted. Even if it
is not accepted that structural considerations should prevail over individual rights analysis, political markets indicate that a more searching
standard of judicial review may be appropriate when such a risk is identified.
(b) The Egalitarian Model and “Process Theory Lite”
The most obvious question that can be asked in the Canadian context is: How can process theory be reconciled with the explicitly normative analysis favoured by the Supreme Court of Canada? And, in the
118
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particular context of the democratic process, how can process theory coexist with the egalitarian model? These questions are not unique to the
Canadian context. For the purpose of this paper, the proposition advanced is that a form of process theory is germane to the review of the
laws that govern the democratic process. No broader claim for the relevance of process theory is made. Even at that, the argument here is that
process theory is consistent with the egalitarian model and at least some
of the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent democratic process case law.
The most trenchant criticism of process theory is that judgments
about fair processes are inherently substantive even though they may
pretend not to be.120 In other words, process theory is covertly substantive. The effect of this criticism is not to deny the utility of process theory in democratic process cases; rather, it begs the question of what
normative theory of democracy informs judgments about fair processes.
The way forward, however, is not to see substantive and process theories as being inherently opposed.121 Michael Dorf argues that Ely recognized that his theory of judicial review, notwithstanding its emphasis on
process, was rooted in an underlying substantive theory of democracy
— the liberal democracy that he lived in.122 While process theory is not
normally associated with robust theories of democracy, there is no inherent reason why that is so. The recognition that a substantive theory of
democracy must inevitably inform process theory enables it to be reconciled in some form with the Supreme Court of Canada’s democratic
process jurisprudence dominated as it is by the egalitarian model.
Perhaps the best example of the marriage of process theory and a
robust theory of democracy is found in Patrick Monahan’s Politics and
the Constitution. Monahan, like Ely, disclaims a substantive approach to
constitutional interpretation. Monahan argues that “[t]he resolution of
Charter issues is not to be found in the philosophies of John Rawls,
Robert Nozick or Ronald Dworkin.” Following in Ely’s footsteps, Monahan finds democracy to be the most persuasive interpretive guide to
the interpretation of the Charter. He even suggests, that process theory is
120
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more suited to the Charter than it is to the U.S. Constitution because of
its explicit emphasis on democracy and relative lack of provisions guaranteeing substantive values.123 Monahan’s understanding of democracy,
however, appears more robust than Ely’s. He writes:
Democracy implies more than simply popular rule. It means, in
addition, a broadening of the opportunities for, and the scope of,
collective deliberation and debate in a political community; it means
identifying and reducing the barriers to effective and equal
participation in the process by all citizens; it means ensuring that there
are no arbitrary and permanent boundaries around the scope of
124
political debate.

To some extent, Monahan’s concept of democracy may be influenced
by his second interpretive principle, communitarianism. The robustness
of Monahan’s conception of democracy is evident in his discussion of
the Alberta Court’s consideration of third party spending restrictions in
National Citizens Coalition v. Canada. “How might a democratic theory
along the lines I propose deal with the issue of election campaign finance?”125 Monahan asks rhetorically. His answer is telling:
If we begin with the proposition that freedom is not simply the
absence of restraint, it becomes possible to conceive of the regulation
of campaign finance as ameliorating freedom rather than limiting it.
The point of the legislation is to restrict the ability of certain wealthy
groups or interests to dominate election campaigns through the
expenditure of money. The legislation is designed to ensure that no
one political perspective is permitted to drown out the competing
messages in the electoral marketplace. This justification becomes
convincing once you push beyond questions of formal access and
negative freedom and focus instead on issues of equality of access and
126
positive freedom.

The foregoing passage echoes the Rawlsian democratic theory upon
which the egalitarian model draws.127 The compatibility between those
123
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aspects of Rawls’ theory of justice that touch upon the democratic process and Ely’s process theory is not as strange as it might seem at first
glance.128 Rawls’ argument for the control of the influence of wealth in
the democratic process (and similar arguments made by many other
liberal scholars) is in some respects process-based and inspired by the
same anti-trust concepts that informed Ely’s view. Ely’s view is that the
political process must be kept open so that there is a competition for
political power. This competition, he surmises, provides the means by
which more substantive objectives, the realization of minority rights for
example, might be achieved. Rawls goes farther. Rawls argues that
economic disparities will inevitably be manifested in a disparity of political power. This is particularly problematic because the Ins can manipulate the system to further enhance their political and economic power at
the expense of the Outs. Rawls writes: “Political power rapidly accumulates and becomes unequal; and making use of the coercive apparatus of
the state and its law, those who gain the advantage can often assure
themselves of a favored position.”129
Monahan’s democratic theory, like Ely’s, shares some characteristics with that of Rawls. Moreover, his analysis of the National Citizens
Coalition case suggests that his conception of democracy is more robust
than Ely’s, perhaps even consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s
egalitarian model. Even if Monahan’s democratic theory can be seen to
be consistent with the egalitarian model, it is not clear if he would advocate deference in the review of Parliament’s matching of means and
ends. He pointed out that “[o]ne need not use a sledgehammer to kill a
fly,”130 but at the same time expressed concern about the ability of
courts to make complex factual and normative judgments in the context

quoted the following passage from Rawls’ Theory of Justice in its Final Report, supra, note 41, at
326:
The liberties protected by the principle of participation [in the democratic process] lose
much of their value whenever those who have greater private means are permitted to use
their advantages to control the course of public debate. For eventually these inequalities will
enable those better situated to exercise a larger influence over the development of legislation. In due time they are likely to acquire a preponderant weight in settling social questions, at least in regard to those things that support their favored circumstances.
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of section 1 proportionality analysis.131 For a more fully developed
approach to judicial review in democratic process cases we must look
farther afield.
One possible source of a fully formed approach of judicial review in
democratic process cases that incorporates aspects of process theory is
found in Richard Hasen’s recent book, The Supreme Court and Election
Law.132 Hasen, a critic of pure process theory and political markets, has
articulated an alternative approach to judicial review in democratic
process cases in the United States. The approach espoused by Hasen is
limited to equality questions; however, this limit is not as constricting as
it might seem because most democratic process cases can be reduced to
questions of political equality. According to Hasen, political equality
rights can be divided into two kinds: core equality rights and contested
equality rights. Core equality rights are the minimal requirements of a
democratic government such as a right to an equal vote. Hasen argues
that core rights are those upon which there is a social consensus or near
consensus. Contested rights in the U.S. context considered by Hasen
include campaign finance controls and other election regulations where
there is no current social consensus. The dependence of Hasen’s classifications on social values makes his theory portable in the sense that if it
is applied in a different context, for example, in Canada, the same values need not be classified as core and contested. The obvious problem
with Hasen’s core/contested dichotomy is whether or not in practice a
distinction can be drawn between the two categories.133
Hasen argues that only core political equality rights should be constitutionalized. By this he means that core political equality rights are
those that may be protected by the Court if the legislature fails to do so.
In the event the Court finds that the right in question is a core political
equality right, there should be no deference to the State. If the Court
finds that the asserted right is a contested political equality right, the
Court should defer to the State’s judgment in a way that does not preclude a legislature subsequently stepping in to protect the contested
political equality right. In this way, the Court allows for an evolution in
the social consensus and the possibility that the contested political
131
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equality right will become a core political equality right. When considering a legislative act that purports to further a contested political
equality right, Hasen suggests, the Court should engage in “careful
balancing of interests.” Hasen goes on to explain:
In the case of a legislative body’s voluntary imposition of a contested
vision of political equality, the Court should be deferential to (but not
a rubber stamp of) the value judgments about the balance between
equality and other interests made by the legislative body while at the
same time be skeptical about the means by which the legislative body
134
purports to enforce the contested equality right.

The scepticism of legislative means prescribed by Hasen is predicated
on the potential abuses that may arise from self-serving behaviour of
elected representatives. In particular, he warns:
... the Court must be especially careful of measures that legislatures
enact in the name of political equality. The potential for self-interested
legislation lurks behind all election laws and the courts must
skeptically inquire whether the means of achieving equality closely fit
the ends of the law. This skepticism serves as a substitute for a probe
135
of legislative “motive” in passing these election laws.

So while Hasen’s approach to judicial review of democratic process
cases is set up as an alternative to process theory and political markets,
one of the main tenets of process theory — distrust of political representatives — plays an important role in the approach he recommends.
As will be explained in the next section, an approach akin to Hasen’s
approach to contested political equality rights is consistent with the
Supreme Court of Canada’s recent jurisprudence of the democratic
process, though notably not with its approach to Harper.
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3. Process Theory Lite and the Supreme Court of Canada’s Recent
Democratic Process Cases
(a) Deference to Democratic Values, Not Legislative Means
The early democratic process cases under the Charter where substantial reasons were given — Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries,
Haig, and Harvey — are notably deferential. Saskatchewan Electoral
Boundaries and Haig are not deferential in the context of section 1, but
rather in acquiescing to Parliament’s limited definition of the right in
question.136 Justice McLachlin, as she then was, in defining the nature of
the right to vote in Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries countenanced
deviations from average electoral district populations of plus or minus
25 per cent as a matter of course and allowed that even greater deviations could be justified under section 1. In doing so, she neglected to
note the self-serving motives behind the Saskatchewan legislation and
the partisan implications of her decision.137 The Court in Haig found
that the right to vote in a referendum was not protected by the section 3
right to vote and, in the specific context of the referenda in question,
neither section 2(b) nor section 15(1) provided any protection. The plurality decision in Harvey found that a restriction on an individual convicted of an election offence from serving in the legislature contravened
section 3, but was justified. LaForest J. wrote:
A degree of deference is especially appropriate in this case where the
impugned legislative provisions are aimed at transgressing members of
the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly. Surely the members of that
body are in the best position to choose between available options when

136
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it comes to deterring other members from breaching the trust that
138
exists between them, the electorate, and the House as a whole.

The Court appeared to maintain a deferential approach in Libman in considering third party expenditure limits in the context of provincial referendum legislation. The Court termed the legislative objective — limiting the
influence of wealth in the political process — “laudable.”139 Despite the
deferential stance toward Parliament’s assessment of the objective of the
legislation, the specific limits were found to be too restrictive. The Court
employed a similar approach in Thomson Newspapers where the constitutionality of a ban on publication of opinion polls was in issue, though with
a less deferential tone.140 Two main purposes were offered by the government in support of the publication ban: (1) the necessity of a rest period prior to an election where no opinion polls could be published so that
voters could deliberate; and (2) the risk of a misleading poll that could not
be corrected prior to election day. Justice Bastarache, writing for the
majority of the Court, refused to accept the first objective but found the
second objective plausible despite a lack of evidence. Even though he
found that misleading polls were potentially harmful to voters, he refused
to defer to Parliament’s choice of means to address the problem. Justice
Bastarache was particularly concerned that Parliament could have substantially addressed the perceived harm by requiring publication of methodological data together with all polls to enable voters to critically assess
the information. He concluded, “[t]he failure to address or explain the
reason for not adopting a significantly less intrusive measure which appears as effective as that actually adopted weighs heavily against the
justifiability of this provision.”141
Even more recently in the context of a section 3 challenge to limits
on the rights of prisoners to vote in Sauvé the Court observed that, “[t]he
right to vote is fundamental to our democracy and the rule of law and
cannot be lightly set aside. Limits on it require not deference, but careful
examination.”142 The Court nevertheless accepted Parliament’s stated
objective as pressing and substantial (though with a healthy degree of
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scepticism) and proceeded to find the means chosen by Parliament to be
unacceptable. The Court’s most recent section 3 case, Figueroa,143 follows the same pattern. The legislative provisions in issue in Figueroa
limited the rights of small political parties to issue tax receipts and the
candidates of small political parties to be identified by their party affiliation on the ballot. Just as in Sauvé, Iacobucci J. writing for the majority
viewed the legislature’s proffered objectives with scepticism, but allowed that the objectives could in some circumstances be pressing and
substantial. Justice Iacobucci went on to find that the legislative provisions did not pass the proportionality aspects of the section 1 analysis.
The Court’s approach to section 1 in Libman, Thomson Newspapers,
Sauvé, and Figueroa can be characterized as deferential to Parliament’s
assessment of democratic values, but sceptical of Parliament’s choice of
means to achieve its objectives. The minority decision in Harper, reviewed earlier in this paper, follows the same approach. What is lacking
from each of these cases is a principled basis for deferring to Parliament
in one aspect of the section 1 analysis but not another. The most obvious
explanation for the Court’s deference in the first part of the section 1
analysis in these cases is that the Court believes that Parliament is the
appropriate body to assess the values that inform the structure of the
Canadian democratic process. The Court’s deference to Parliament in
this regard is made easy by the fact that the political philosophy that
forms the intellectual underpinnings of the democratic system is generally consistent with the Court’s democratic theory.
The Court’s lack of deference in the proportionality aspect of the
section 1 analysis is harder to explain. Certainly one can discern specific
reasons for a sceptical approach in each case, but what is needed is a
larger explanation. The best explanation, however, is one that cannot be
found in the Court’s words. The reason why the Court should be sceptical of Parliament’s choice of means is the inherent conflict of interest in
Members of Parliament setting the rules of the political game. This is
the fundamental insight of process theory and political markets. To
recognize this fact and integrate it into an approach to judicial review in
democratic process cases is not to capitulate to a narrowly procedural
form of judicial review. Like the approach proposed by Hasen to contested equality rights in the U.S., process theory can inform the second
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stage of section 1 analysis. The Court may, indeed in many cases it
should, defer to Parliament’s assessment of democratic values in the
first stage of section 1 analysis before critically assessing the chosen
means of achieving those objectives. Recognizing Parliament’s role in
determining democratic norms does not lessen the danger posed by selfinterested status quo preserving legislation.
The Court has shown a decided preference to turn a blind eye to the
self-interested motives of provincial legislatures and Parliament in democratic process cases. Even in Figueroa where the impugned provisions
were designed to hamper the electoral fortunes of small political parties,
the bona fides of Parliament was not questioned. The reason for the
Court’s reticence may be a lack of evidence, good manners, or naïveté.
Despite the Court’s curious inattention to Parliament’s conflict of interest, Iacobucci J.’s reasons in Figueroa provide a powerful tool to combat self-serving legislation enacted in the name of democratic values.
Justice Iacobucci held that “legislation that exacerbates a pre-existing
disparity in the capacity of the various political parties to communicate
their positions to the general public is inconsistent with
s. 3.”144 This rule, if it may be called that, is consistent with the basic
premise of process theory; namely, that legislation should not impinge
upon participatory rights in a way that helps to keep the Ins in and the
Outs out. Justice Iacobucci’s interpretation of section 3 in Figueroa is
relevant to the approach to judicial review in democratic process cases
proposed in this paper because it demonstrates that on some level at
least, the values that infuse process theory are consistent with the
Court’s conception of democracy.
(b) Harper v. Canada: Deference Run Amok?
Harper is notably more deferential than other recent Supreme Court
decisions concerning the democratic process. One reason that can be
offered for the deference in Harper, though not identified by the Court,
is that third party spending limits do not affect competition between
candidates and political parties. Indeed, one of the premises of third
party spending limits is that they protect the competitive balance between electoral participants. As a result, there is a legitimate question as
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to whether third party spending limits merit as careful scrutiny as more
direct and obvious incumbent protection measures.145 The critical approach to the proportionality aspects of section 1 analysis outlined in the
previous sections of this paper is intended to combat self-interested
legislation in the electoral realm. Limits on third party spending, however, are not as obviously self-serving as gerrymandering or even other
political finance controls. Limits on third party spending serve a legitimate end; namely, supporting an egalitarian political finance regime. At
the same time, however, third party spending limits may also shield
candidates and political parties from criticism. Whether or not Parliament was acting in a self-interested fashion when implementing third
party spending limits, strict scrutiny is warranted because electoral laws
are uniquely vulnerable to abuse and legislative motive can never be
truly ascertained. As Hasen suggests, scepticism is “a substitute for a
probe of legislative ‘motive’” in the electoral realm.146
Scepticism is decidedly absent from the majority decision in Harper. Justice Bastarache held that the rules that apply to elections reflect
“a political choice, the details of which are better left to Parliament.”147
He offers no reason why the Court should defer to Parliament’s “political choice” regarding the details of the electoral process other than Parliament’s “right to choose Canada’s electoral model.”148 Although not
stated, this idea harkens back to the majority judgment in Figueroa
where Iacobucci J. stated that “the Charter is entirely neutral as to the
type of electoral system in which the right to vote or to run for office is
to be exercised.”149 Justice Iacobucci went on to explain in response to
criticism from the Figueroa minority that in finding that promotion of
majority governments was not a pressing and substantial objective he
did “not mean to suggest that Parliament must choose an electoral system that the Court believes will result in “good” or “better” governance.
The Charter aside, the choice among electoral processes is, as LeBel J.
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states, a political one — and not one in which the Court should involve
itself.”150 The context in which Iacobucci J.’s remarks were made in
Figueroa suggests that he was concerned about the implication that his
reasons had for the first-past-the-post system, not laws governing the
democratic process generally.151 Justice Bastarache in Harper, however,
seems to understand laws governing the democratic process to be, if not
beyond judicial review, certainly worthy of great deference.
The question to be answered by the Court in future democratic process cases is whether there is some principled basis for the extreme
deference in Harper. If the Court’s deferential stance is an aberration, as
I suspect that it is, then the Court is still left with the problem of articulating a reasoned approach to democratic process cases that will provide
a measure of consistency from case to case. The approach to judicial
review in democratic process cases outlined in this paper is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s recent democratic process cases other than
Harper and offers a coherent explanation for both deference to Parliament’s assessment of democratic norms and critical evaluation of Parliament’s means chosen to implement its democratic vision.

V. CONCLUSION
Dialogue is the most fashionable account of the relationship between the Court and Parliament. The idea of a never ending conversation, however unsatisfying, is probably an accurate description of the
interplay of the Court and Parliament over time. Dialogue, however, is a
descriptive theory of judicial review, not a prescriptive one. The fact
that the Court and Parliament engage in a dialogue does not provide any
guidance as to which institution’s views should prevail in any given
circumstance. This paper has not attempted to supplant dialogue as the
means of understanding judicial review in the context of challenges to
laws governing the democratic process. Instead, this paper has
attempted to articulate an approach to democratic process cases that
gives structure to the dialogue between the Court and Parliament.
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To begin with, the Court should in most instances defer to Parliament’s assessment of democratic values. As a democratic institution,
Parliament is better placed than the Court to ascertain the norms that
should inform the democratic process. Both Libman and Harper follow
this prescription and endorse the egalitarian model of election regulation
in concept. The Court, however, must be cautious to confine its deference to the electoral realm. Deference to the choice of political philosophy that informs election regulation does not extend to the regulation of
activity outside the electoral domain. The Court in Harper failed to
cabin its deference and was uncritical of Parliament’s regulation of pure
issue advocacy. Finally, the Court must recognize that the regulation of
the democratic process is vulnerable to abuse. The Court is uniquely
suited, and Parliament is particularly ill equipped, to police selfinterested behaviour on the part of Parliament. The best way for the
Court to fulfill its role in this regard is to critically assess the means
chosen by Parliament to effect its objective in the section 1 proportionality analysis.
Dialogue is also an apt description of the relationship between the
Court and the legal academy. The Court is dependent in some respects
on the constructive criticism that it receives from the legal academy.
The Canadian legal academy has engaged the Court in dialogue on
many important subjects; however, comparatively little has been said
about the law of the democratic process. Harper is a decision that raises
important questions about the nature of political speech, the political
philosophy that informs the regulation of the democratic process, and
the relationship between the Court and Parliament. There is much to be
said about all of these subjects. Moreover, the problems with the Harper
decision indicate that the Supreme Court could benefit from some dialogue. As two critics of the infamous Bush v. Gore case wrote, “the
academy must do its part to hold the Court accountable through reasoned criticism.”152
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